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JPRS L/9065

1 May 1980

Korean Affairs Report

(FOUO 3/80)



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KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

SPECULATION MADE ABOUT SOUTH KOREA'S NEW LEADERS

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Jan 80 pp 28-37

[Article by Takao Ona: "Who Will Be Korea's New President"]

[Excerpt] The next regular president will need to fill the following requirements:

1. Man of integrity. Up to this point the upper class of Korea has been very corrupt. There was much corruption during President Syngman Rhee's administration, and conditions didn't change during President Pak's. Almost all of the people who became political leaders as a result of their roles in the independence movement have amassed great fortunes by dishonest means. Previous KCIA directors provide an excellent example. Kim Ch'ae-kyu was the eighth KCIA Director during President Pak's 18-year tenure. The average length of service per person has been 2 years and 3 months. These eight men all accumulated great wealth. The first director, Kim Chong-pil, was ousted by Yi Hu-rak, but not before he became known as one of the wealthiest men in Korea. As for Yi Hu-rak, it is said his wealth has reached astronomical figures from his days as the head of the President's Secretariat. Whether this is true or not is unknown, but it is also said that he was the moneybags for President Pak's election campaign. The third director, Kim Chae-chun, also accumulated a massive fortune even though he was only in for 6 months. The sixth KCIA director, Kim Hyong-uk, testified before the United States Congress during the Pak Tong-hui incident about influence purchasing attempts among American politicians, implicating several members of the Korean cabinet. However, the idea that he had fled to the United States because he had been charged by President Pak for illegal bribes is not beyond reason. Kim Chong-pil, Kim Chae-ch'un, and Kim Hyong-uk, as well as Director of Metropolitan Police Yun Pil-yong (who was imprisoned for bribery), were all members of the famous eighth graduating class of the Korean military academy which led the revolution to success and helped Pak Chong-hui come to power. Something is wrong with a political system which allows people to accumulate such fortunes, and the Korean people are aware of this. These types of people will probably not be elected, and if they are Korea's tragedies can be expected to be repeated.

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2. The second qualification is the ability to control the military. Korea is a military nation. Regardless of the people's like or dislike of their adversary relationship with North Korea, national security is the overriding priority. Accordingly, the military units bearing this burden have great power, and the military particularly has a powerful voice in political affairs. Also, the next president will have to possess an adequate military background in order to be able to cope in the event of an emergency action against North Korea, as well as sufficient knowledge of military affairs to handle military policies on a day-to-day basis. It is absolutely essential that the next president be someone the military trusts as well as someone who can control the military.

For reference sake, the backgrounds of Korean military leaders have been divided into the following three general groups.

Group one. When the armed forces were formed at the time of Korea's independence, a military school was established. Group one is comprised of graduates of this school. At first it was mainly staffed by veterans who had been trained in the Japanese and Manchurian armies, but academicians also joined to form the nucleus of the school. President Pak was a graduate of the second class. Those who put him in power, led by Kim Chong-pil, are members of the eighth graduating class. The school continued for ten classes. At the time of the Korean War, graduates of the tenth class were active as platoon leaders, etc., and those who remained in the military are today mostly in the general officer class.

The second group includes those who are formal graduates of the Korean Military Academy, established in 1950. It was founded by President Pak and by General Yi Han-yim, who is also a graduate of the Japan Military Academy, and who personally served as the first head of the new academy. This academy incorporated the strong points of both the Japan Military Academy and the United States academies, and it developed fine officers through tough training and rugged individualism. The first class was caught up in the Korean War after only a year, and many of them were killed. The second and subsequent classes received a full 4 years of formal schooling despite the continuing war. Today the most illustrious of these graduates is Major General Chon Tu-hwan, Commanding General of the Defense Security Command (Director of the Joint Investigation Headquarters under Martial Law Command), who just arrested KCIA Director Kim Ch'ae-kyu. Including majors and brigadier generals, there are today approximately 50 general officers from the academy serving in important military line and staff positions such as division commanders. There are two views regarding the cohesiveness of graduates of the academy. The first view is that the ties among these graduates is extremely strong, and the second is that they are not because up till this point associations have been frowned upon by the KCIA. However, it is believed there is sufficient cohesion for them to unify in the event of an emergency. Both inside the military as well as in a domestic sense this group is like the eye of a hurricane. Within the military their statements carry immense

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weight, and there is no doubt that they can also influence the public as well. Presently, there are academies for each of the three branches of the armed services, but the navy and air force academies are small, and they are not a part of this power clique.

The third group includes those who participated in the Korean War at the same time that the regular military academy was being established. This involved only three or four classes, but they produced many heroes. However, they do not exert any concentrated power and in addition it is difficult to identify exactly who belongs to this group. For instance, included are those who are now in the reserves after having received ROTC training in college and served as officers in the military. Perhaps including them is not totally proper, but they are very numerous.

However, although at the present time the military has declared emergency martial law, it has also stated that it will not participate in the election process, and that their policy is to support acting President Kyu Ha-choi.

3. Someone acceptable to the United States. This is another condition which cannot be overlooked. If Korea were abandoned by the United States it would be thrown into turmoil. For instance, public opinion started boiling at President Carter's announcement of withdrawal of American troops stationed in Korea. Although the troop withdrawal was postponed for the time being because of U.S. military estimates of a large military buildup by North Korea, in light of President Carter's human rights diplomacy the United States will seize this opportunity to put pressure on Korea to select more democratic leaders. Many signs have already appeared of this pressure on Korea in efforts to force it to comply with the spirit of the Korean Security Pact, and South Korea is now trying to do so. Someone who can work with the United States is a very important consideration.

4. Someone not born in North Korea. This may be thought to be somewhat inconsequential, but the South Korean "allergy" to North Korea is something that cannot be ignored. President Pak shunned North Koreans, chiefly elevating people from his native province of Kyongsang. The number of people from his home area in high political and especially financial circles is startling. Resentment of this "Kyongsang Mafia" is very strong.

When President Pak initiated the revolution, he set much store on the contributions of people from North Korea. But after the revolution they were not permitted to enter the country, and many of the now out-of-favor North Koreans quickly immigrated to the United States or retreated into religion. As a result, today most Christian organizations in South Korea are opposition hotbeds and radical anti-establishment organizations. People born in North Korea are numerous, and the people who were not able to immigrate or enter religion have become a source of domestic unrest. How to deal with the "Kyongsang Mafia" and the displaced North Koreans will be a difficult problem for some time to come.

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5. Someone with charisma. This is only the opinion of this writer, but charisma is an absolute essential.

Someone with the appeal of President Pak is not likely to come forth, but it will not be possible for someone lacking some degree of charisma to become president and effectively lead the country.

There are obviously other political and experience conditions, but by and large someone filling the above qualifications will be chosen as the formal successor.

Therefore, this is nothing more than speculation, but since the names of Kim Chong-pil, Yi Hu-rak, Chong Il-kwon, and Pak Chong-kyu have appeared in the news media, a look at them on an individual basis is in order.

Acting President Choi Kyu-ha will probably be the last president to be in office longer than a normal term. Choi attended high school in Tokyo, graduate school at "Daido" in Manchuria, and has been a professor at Seoul University. He was at one time the head of the Korean Consulate General to Japan. Having no military background or great charisma, he himself has said he will not run for election.

Kim Chong-pil

Once the prime minister, Kim received the backing of President Pak and has made a comeback to become president of the party in power, the Republican Party. Although he initially said that he would not run in the December presidential elections in order to avoid causing further confusion, he is now very much inclined to do so. At the present time he is commonly believed to be the favorite. A very forceful person, he has many enemies, and in order to achieve his objectives it will be necessary for him to suppress these political foes. That will be a problem, and the fact that in the past he has lacked somewhat in the first area of integrity will also hurt him. The public and the military will probably overlook past mistakes, but they will have misgivings.

Yi Hu-rak

Once considered a man of great ability, he overdid things during the Kim Dae-jung incident and fell into disfavor. For a time he apparently retreated into seclusion at a temple studying, but he has since made a comeback as a non-elected member of the Korean Congress. He is ambitious, but his chances are not considered to be good, and his main effect has been to elevate the chances of Kim Chong-pil. He has close connections with the U.S. CIA, but does that mean that the United States will support him? Also, will the Korean people elect someone with his corrupt record?

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Chong Il-kwon

Chong Il-kwon possesses a splendid record as Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the counterattack during the Korean War, as Ambassador to the United States and France, and as President of the Korean Congress. He is highly intelligent, and he handles himself flawlessly. A member of the Japan Academy class of 1955 and a veteran of the Manchurian army, he was senior even to President Pak. If chosen as his successor he will be a progressive leader. He is also highly acceptable to the United States and enjoys the trust of the people. However, it is unfortunate that he is of North Korean origin, and he lacks charisma. He may also lack the ambition to become president.

Pak Chong-kyu

The former Chief of the Presidential Security Service, he resigned after having accepted responsibility for the Yuk Yong-su shooting incident, and so it will not be necessary to consider him further.

In conclusion, it is believed that there is no really suitable successor among these men. If this writer were to make a bold guess as to whom might follow it would be that some candidate might appear with the backing of the military. The military might pick an active or retired military leader and act to sway public opinion to put him in office. Certainly there is someone in the military who is both upright and charismatic. However, it will still be a little too early for a graduate of the regular military academy. Major General Chon Tu-hwan of the Defense Security Command has been mentioned in some newspapers, but it is still too early for him. Rather, isn't he in a position to put someone else in power? The feeling one gets is that General Han Sin, former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a prime candidate. He meets all the requirements. The only question is whether he is inclined to seek office. Finally, this writer apologizes to all candidates, and he realizes that all the above can be disregarded as mere speculation by an outsider.

Ten million refugees to come to Japan.

The present and future problems of South Korea following President Pak's death have been related in great detail, but the fact of the matter is South Korea wants stability above all else. It would not be overconfident to say that within grasp is peace with the world as well as prosperity like Japan's. If the Carter administration were to give generous support towards stabilization, it would help solve many of their problems. On the other hand, in the case of Japan, Prime Minister Ohira announced that he would attend the state funeral for President Pak, but then he canceled his visit for political reasons. The head of the Banking, Commerce, and Industries Association, a previous Ambassador to Japan, criticized this as an example of a wait-and-see attitude in Japanese economic and political

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circles, but as a member of a pro-Japanese faction his words are probably representative of the feelings of the Korean people. Japan should listen more carefully to what is being said.

If the South were to fall into the hands of North Korea, it is entirely possible that 10 million South Korean refugees would attempt to flee to Japan. The Vietnamese and Cambodian refugee problem would be nothing compared to this. When I submitted this idea to several political leaders, I was given the cold shoulder with "Japan would not be able to accommodate the refugees."

We Japanese must be more neighborly and pay more attention to people less fortunate than we throughout the world. Then we must act in accordance with reality.

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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE KOREAN MILITARY OBSERVED

Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Jan 80 pp 150-158

[Journalist Yasuhiro Maeda states the relationship between Pak's death and the old and new military leaders of South Korea]

[Text] Pak Chong-hui had held supreme power in South Korea for the 18 and one half years since he, as a major general, had himself led young officers in a military coup d'etat. On the evening of 26 October 1979 he was killed by a pistol shot from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) Director Kim Chae-hyu, an associate from Pak's locale and from his class at the Korean Military Academy (KMA). This closed the curtain on a dictatorship of length unprecedented in that country.

The 'leading players' in this shocking murder mystery were, in addition to President Pak and Director Kim, Presidential Secretary General Kim Kye-won and Presidential Security Force [PSF] Director Ch'a Chi-ch'ol. These four men who were at the center of power suddenly fell into a relationship of murderer and victim. Investigating the facts of this tragedy is the Joint Investigation Headquarters (Defense Security Command Chief Chon Tu-hwan) of the Martial Law Command, of which Army Chief of Staff Chong Sung-hwa is Martial Law Commander. A 'post-Pak system' is about to be created wholly by the military.

Naturally the future course of the military is the focus of interest inside and outside South Korea.

The long rule of President Pak, who had a military background, was supported by the KCIA, the Army Security Command (CIC--in 1977 the three services were combined to form the Defense Security Command), the Presidential Security Force and Secretariat, and by the cabinet and national enterprises; these organizations include large numbers of persons with military backgrounds or connections. On the other hand, a new phenomenon has come up quickly in the past few years--the shift to a new technocrat class, civil officials trained in Europe or the U.S., and a new generation within the military itself. The 'human element' which will move South Korea hereafter has become more complex. The leadership of the new era will be outlined here, with a focus on

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the established power group, which has experienced terrific power struggles and repeated changes of alignment, and on the movements of the young professional military men backed by 600,000 troops.

Despite the stimulus of the great misfortune of the shooting of the president, the political and military situation has, on the surface, remained miraculously calm. On the basis of martial law and in the name of preparation for the eventuality of war, immediately following the incident all South Korean military forces were put in an alert status and directed toward maintaining domestic order. This is seen as a factor which kept the people calm.

Some even suspected that some sort of 'prior' arrangements had been made to handle the incident in an orderly way. Rumors of a military coup d'etat or of some military involvement circulated inside and outside the country.

On 6 November the Joint Investigation Headquarters put together a final report on the shooting and, attempting to settle the case, stressed that "KCIA Director Kim Chae-kyu acted alone in trying to seize power, and the military was not involved in the matter."

However, the relationship which Director Kim Chae-kyu, the criminal, and the KCIA organization as a whole have with the military is close, personal and unseverable. Director Kim was the father of the Army Security Command, and many of his followers remain within the present Defense Security Command led by Chon Tu-hwan. It is impossible, for that reason, to fathom the shock this incident gave the military as a whole. It can be said, in view of the intricately involved interrelationships of these influential figures, that it will take the military a long time to recover from the turmoil.

It is not hard to imagine that the military of South Korea, which in the 30 years the state has existed has come to pride itself on having one of the world's strongest armies, has lost its confidence at least temporarily in the unusual situation wherein a subordinate has used his weapon to send the head of state to the grave. There have been, therefore, more than a few predictions that the military would run wild, but a month after the incident the possibility of a coup d'etat by the military has disappeared.

Immediately after the incident, Defense Minister No Chae-hyon joined with Chief of Staff Chong Sung-hwa and other leaders of the three services to announce a policy of support for the interim government centering on Acting President Ch'oe Kyu-ha. The people of South Korea, and also such friendly countries as Japan and the U.S., were again impressed with the pervasive presence of that country's military. At the same time, there were growing fears that the military might move toward establishment of a 'Pak-less Pak system', that is, a military government. However, on 3 November U.S. Secretary of State Vance, who attended the state funeral for President Pak, demanded a democratic system in South Korea and it became clear that the military fully supported civilian government, thus for the time being reassuring those within and without voicing desire for civilian rule.

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It came about that the military authorities withdrew (on 7 November) from the Emergency Measures Council that was formed from the military and the cabinet right after the incident, and procedures were worked out for the election of a President in December under Acting President Ch'oe, and for revision of the constitution. It is still possible, however, for the military to exercise behind the scene influence until the new regime is established, and it is quite possible that influential persons with military backgrounds or high military officials will participate directly in the new regime.

Looking at the leaders who will be responsible, it appears, for the regular government following the Ch'oe interim government, there are established persons of influence who have produced 'records' of upholding the Pak regime through repeated ups and downs, and there are opposition forces and opposition party leaders, primarily non-military. If financial power, influence within the government party and the support of the military are considered to be factors in the ability to run the government, it is clear that influential persons of military background, who extended their influence as fierce struggles for loyalty developed under President Pak, will line up as close as possible to the new government.

Personal Ties

It is said that there are in South Korea some 141 persons trained in the Japanese Army Officers School during the nearly 60 years up to 1945 when the country became independent on the defeat of Japan (from the South Korean monthly magazine WOLGAN CHUNGANG, August 1977). According to this magazine, 114 of these served in the Japanese Army, and 27 passed through the preparatory course of the Manchurian Army Officers School before entering the standard course of the Japanese Military Academy. These included President Pak and also Chong Il-kwon (former speaker of the National Assembly, former prime minister), Yu Chae-hung (former minister of defense), Chong Hyok-nae (former minister of defense), Chang Sa-ryang (former chief of Naval Operations), and Yi Se-ho (former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former minister of defense). In addition there are many with backgrounds in the old Japanese Army as student soldiers or conscripts, and Ambassador to Japan Kim Chong-yom (presidential secretary general for 10 years from November 1969) experienced the bombing of Hiroshima as an enlisted man. Former Lieutenant General Ch'oe Tok-sin (a graduate of China's Whampoa Military Academy, age 65), who served as Foreign Minister for two and a half years beginning in October 1961, just after the coup d'etat by Major General Pak, once characterized General Pak's regime as 'the most pro-Japanese government Korea has ever produced.' Ch'oe lost out in a power struggle with the Japanese Military Academy faction and fled to the U.S., where he has engaged in anti-Pak propaganda since the end of 1977.

The South Korean Army began as the National Defense Constabulary following liberation from Japan in 1945. On 5 October 1948, with the establishment of the Syngman Rhee regime, it became independent of the U.S. military government and was constituted as a regular army. It was necessary to quickly

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recruit a military cadre, and the 'Military English School' (January to June 1948) was created. This was a matter of recruiting former military men with a variety of experiences in the former Japanese army, the Chinese army and the anti-Japanese Korean army, and having the U.S. Army retrain them in American methods. One who shone among these was Yi Hu-rak, a legislator of the ruling Democratic-Republican Party (former KCIA director, former ambassador to Japan). Another was Presidential Secretary General Kim Kye-won (age 56), the accomplice in the shooting of President Pak. Secretary General Kim was also one of the group that entered the school from Yonhui College Business Administration Department, (predecessor of the present Yonsei University). The Military English School lasted a mere half year, but over a hundred graduated; using English freely, they served as an active link with the U.S. forces in South Korea.

Then in June 1948 the National Defense Constabulary Academy was established, and with the creation of the state in 1948 it was officially named the Korean Military Academy. At that time it was intensive education lasting from one and a half to six months. The First Class included Special Presidential Advisor So Chong-ch'ol (former Defense Minister, age 54) and National Unification Board member Kim Chom-kon (former Major General, age 56).

Interestingly enough, both President Pak and KCIA Director Kim Chae-kyu (age 53) were members of the Second Class. Director Kim had been a middle school teacher in Taegu, but Pak, who was nine years his senior but from the same home town, urged Kim to 'come along to the military academy.' Kim entered the academy at the age of 20 and it is said his marks were always at the top of the class. Until 1950 when the Korean war broke out, training usually lasted six months, and the creation of senior officers was rushed. A prominent member of the third class was Minister of Defense No Chae-hyon (age 53). Having served as army chief of staff in 1972 and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff in 1975, he was the first member of his class to become a cabinet minister (1977).

In the emergency cabinet meeting called by the Defense Ministry after the crime, No immediately arrested Director Kim Chae-kyu, who puffed out his chest and said, 'the United States is behind me,' and thus No had the distinction of preventing seizure of the government--a coup d'etat embroiling the military.

In the Fourth Class was Kim Chong-hwan, who succeeded No as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has served in that position since 1977. The role of the chairman is to coordinate activities among the three services. Heading the list of the fifth class was Army Chief of Staff Chong Sung-hwa. Actual control over the army is concentrated in Chong; he also serves as Martial Law Commander and can be called the strongest person in the military at present. Like President Pak and Director Kim Chae-kyu he came from Kyongsang Province, and there are still many puzzling questions about his actions at the time of the crime, such as the matter of his having been summoned by Director Kim and being near the scene of the shooting.

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The "elite Eighth Class" among the revolutionary forces which took action along with Major General Pak began training in December 1948. To form a regular army a call was made for 1800 men and over 30,000 young men responded; an assembly of talent was selected from the best of Korea's youth at that time. They were commissioned as the first officers after Korean independence, and they went into the Korean War two years later as first lieutenants. Most of them died in that war. There were many youth in the Eighth Class who had come south from a dislike for the communist system. They formed an officer class with a strong sense of anti-communism, and it should be noted that this determined the subsequent thought structure of the South Korean military. The few survivors are represented by ruling Democratic-Republican Party President Kim Chong-p'il (former Prime Minister). Next is Yi Pyong-hui, a legislator of that party (former First Minister Without Portfolio, age 53), who is known as a pipeline between Japan and South Korea. And there are other personalities who have subsequently spent lives full of turmoil, like the legislator of the same party Kil Chon-sik (age 55); former Army Security Command chief Kang Ch'ang-song (former major general, age 52), presently director of the Maritime and Port Authority; Kim Hyong-uk (former KCIA director, in his 40's); O Ch'i-song (former minister of home affairs); Kim Tong-hwan (former Republican Party floor leader); and Kil Chae-ho (former Republican Party secretary general).

Even now the military is largely in the hands of the Seventh and Eighth Classes, which provided the present commanders of the corps guarding the border, the First, Second and Third Army Commanders, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the vice minister and Assistant Deputy Minister of Defense. The war broke out just after the Ninth Class began school, and the Eleventh Class, which entered school in June 1950, was the first composed of high school graduates selected for four years of education; they graduated the spring following the end of the war in 1953. It is this Eleventh Class that is usually called the First Class of the Korean Military Academy. Defense Security Command Chief Chon Tu-hwan is a member of this new First Class. All of them have become generals since 1973, and they are the group which will grasp the real power upon the retirement of the senior group of military officers, which is expected to be accelerated on the occasion of this change of government.

The present size of the Military Academy has about 250 cadets per year, and 100 each more for the Naval and Air Force Academy. All together about 400 per year become officers to direct the 600,000-man military. President Pak considered the personal ties of the academy to be important, and in 1977 he had his oldest son, Chi-man (age 21) enrolled in the Military Academy, where he is now in his second year.

The Korean War was the occasion for great expansion of the South Korean military, and including marines it reached a scale of 650,000 men by 1970. At this time there are no longer a Marine Corps (abolished as of the end of 1973), but the military is still huge, with an army of 550,000 (1,100,000 reserves), an air force of 30,000 (55,000 reserves) and a navy of 25,000 (25,000 reserves).

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Retirements, Purges and Falls

Korean society was to a large degree closed, on the basis of an awareness of blood-relations, pedigree and school and provincial ties, and had come to be characterized by a lack of ability to organize human resources. Under the influence of the U.S. military, however, the South Korean military grew into the only segment of society having strong organization and vertical and horizontal solidarity.

There are many who take the view that the military, having attained such great strength, is evident in all political matters and dominates the political situation of South Korea. So far, though, the military has maintained quite strict political neutrality, and it also avoided involvement in politics during the 12 years of dictatorship of Syngman Rhee. At the time of the outbreak of the student revolution in April 1960 the military did not attempt to take action, in contrast to security and police authorities that set about repressing the masses. And at the time of the military coup d'etat by Major General Pak Chong-hui's group, the other military units did not take political action.

What President Pak, who had come to power on the basis of his military strength, feared most as he held power subsequently was none other than military intervention in political matters. Therefore in addition to purging and driving out politicians in general, he caused generals with the political strength to become future political enemies and key officers who could develop leadership in the military as a whole to retire one after another, and diverted them into enterprises with no direct relations with the administration. Thus he redoubled his efforts to nip in the bud any 'second coup d'etat.'

Directly after the 16 May coup d'etat President Pak Chong-hui showed his fangs by transferring more than 260 general officers to reserve status, isolating them from the center of military affairs. For the past 18 years he has done all he could to remove prominent military figures, and has not permitted the existence of a number two man. In the period prior to President Pak's inauguration at the end of 1963 nine cases of attempted rebellion designated as 'plots against the state' were exposed. All of these were struggles to seize power in opposition to the Pak-Kim Chong-p'il line; the first began with the arrest of Supreme Council for National Reconstruction Chairman Chang To-yong, the coup d'etat figurehead who had been appointed chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee from his position as Army Chief of Staff. Revolutionary Committee members Brigadier General Song Ch'an-ho and Colonel Pak Ch'i-ok were deposed at the same time as Chairman Chang, but in all these cases they were from north of the 38th parallel. In the Syngman Rhee era, President Rhee had himself come from the north, and northerners made up 80 or 90 percent of the South Korean military leadership at that time. For this reason, President Pak began with moves to put the military in the hands of southerners. With strong pressure from the U.S., Chairman Chang managed to take asylum in the U.S. Later, in 1977, Yujonghoe member Kan Mun-pong (former Lieutenant General) was jailed for corruption. Kang, who was said to be close to ..

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former National Assembly Speaker Chong Il-kwon (from Hamgyong Province), was accused of plotting the overthrow of the Pak regime, and there were rumors of the 'final treason' of influential northerners against President Pak.

One remarkably long-lived northerner was the super-elite Chong Il-kwon, who held a series of key posts in the military and even served as Prime Minister and Speaker of the National Assembly. He had the reputation and military record to withstand President Pak, and he was well-received by the American military; he was early considered a likely successor, but as a northerner, the path to number one was closed to him.

President Pak, exhibiting his adroit trickery and unusual skill in personnel administration even against the revolutionary core group, the coup comrades of the KMA Eighth Class, attempted to divide them into small factions and diffuse their energy.

In 1977 the influential South Korean evening newspaper TONGA ILBO surveyed the paths of some 87 men from among the revolutionary mainstream force. Some like Kim Chong-p'il and legislator Pak Chong-kyu (former PSF chief) were still powerful and found in prominent places such as the National Assembly, the PSF, the KCIA, state-run enterprises and the cabinet. But over half had suffered such tragic fates as being deposed, imprisoned or exiled. More than twenty--such as former Lieutenant General Pak Im-hang--lacked means of daily support. Even the eight who have served as Director of the KCIA, founded by President Pak, have had dramatic fates. Three are left: Kim Chong-p'il, the first; legislator Yi Hu-rak, the sixth; and Special Presidential Advisor Sin Sik-su, the seventh. Kim Hyong-uk, who boasted the longest tenure as KCIA Director at six years and three months, displayed great shrewdness as President Pak's right-hand man. He shifted huge amounts of money to the U.S., and became a topic of conversation through exposure of the involvement of the Pak government and the KCIA in payoffs to U.S. congressmen and the kidnapping of Kim Tae-chung; he is one of the 'influential persons' who escaped abroad. One wonders why Secretary General Kim Kye-won (the fifth), who enjoyed the confidence of President Pak, decided to cast his lot with Director Kim Chae-kyu. There are many who make the interpretation that President Pak was ready to demote him, and that it was a matter of the cornered mouse biting the cat.' The truth of the matter, however, has not yet been made known.

Kim Chong-p'il, who married President Pak's niece, has also repeatedly come into conflict with the President, and has been compelled to travel abroad. After leaving the post of Prime Minister at the end of 1975 he lived in seclusion for nearly four years.

And Yi Hu-rak, from the time of the Kim Tae-chung kidnapping in the summer of 1973 to his election to the National Assembly in the general election at the end of last year, was allowed no political life at all.

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The Old Gang of Five And the New Gang of Three

From the 1960s until 1973 five men from the revolutionary mainstream force--these Kim and Yi, PSF Chief Pak Chong-kyu, Capital Security Command Chief Yun P'il-yong and Army Security Command Chief Kang Ch'ang-song--formed the nucleus of the Pak regime. However, Commander Yun was suddenly removed from his post on charges of embezzlement and accepting bribes, and Commander Kang also disappeared for several years because of corruption. Security Force Chief Pak was held responsible for an incident of sniping at President Pak in the summer of 1974 (in which Yuk Yong-su, the President's wife was killed) and removed from his post. In this way the era of 'five close associates' came to an end.

After that the aura of direct Presidential rule grew even stronger. Bureaucrats with purely administrative backgrounds emerged--men like Prime Minister Ch'oe Kyu-ha, Foreign Minister Pak Tong-ching and Culture Minister Kim Song-chin--and growing numbers of special Presidential advisors and secretaries had backgrounds as scholars or journalists.

During the first half of the Pak regime, from 1961 to 1971 or 1972, there were many former military men appointed to all fields of endeavor. They were elements which supported the Pak regime from the outside. During the Syngman Rhee era the cabinet members of military background amounted to seven or eight percent, but under the Pak regime one out of four ministers was military, 23 percent of the members of the Seventh National Assembly (1967) were of military origin, the presidents of many business and financial institutions were general officers, and the majority of the heads of state-run enterprises were usually military elders. This was a policy that killed two birds with one stone: on the one hand it could be used to separate military elders from the military organization while avoiding their discontent by giving them a certain amount of financial power; on the other hand it brought about an expansion of the forces of the ruling party. In many cases persons of influence who were not given these diverse posts were regarded as 'elements' who could not live under the Pak regime and left the country as emigrants or exiles; many of them subsequently turned to the anti-Pak movement.

After the system of 'five close associates' crumbled, those who constituted the new close associates of President Pak, apart from the bureaucrats with purely administrative backgrounds, were Kim Chae-kyu, Kim Kye-kyu [as published] and Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, all of military origin, who took the leading parts in the current assassination. Previous [PSF chiefs] Pak Chong-kyu and Kim Chong-yom were both civil officials with no record of service in the Korean military. PSF Chief Ch'a Chi-ch'ol had been a paratrooper who graduated from U.S. Infantry School, and although militarily second class to the KMA graduates Kim Kye-won and Kim Chae-kyu, without question President Pak was set on having military men for his new close associates. The 'new gang of three' which took power in place of the 'old gang of five' counterbalanced each other in the struggle of loyalties, and faced catastrophe as they surrounded the pivotal President Pak. It cannot be denied that the fall of the 'old gang of five'

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was also the result of dissention and power struggles among Kim, Yi, Pak, Yun and Kang. Although he was able to avoid being shot with a pistol at that time, it is hard not to imagine that President Pak repeatedly faced explosive crises around 1973.

President Pak, who cut down without mercy the powerful and those who had brought about the military coup d'etat, had while causing struggles for loyalty among the new gang of three intended to ride out the second phase of the restoration movement which started at the end of 1978, but in the end, everything "exploded."

This crime unintentionally brought to the surface the South Korean military's complex personal ties, which are intertwined with rank and seniority.

It appears that Director Kim Chae-kyu originally tried to win over Army Chief of Staff (General) Chong. He was confident that it was he himself who had made General Chong the Chief of Staff. The background of his claim of 'U.S. backing' may have been the idea that if the incumbent Director of the KCIA took organized and decisive action, the U.S. would have to give tacit recognition, even if only after the fact. In Korea it is often the case that when an influential person changes posts he takes along the direct subordinates in whom he has confidence, at the same time creating a communal organization which is firmly united in terms of status and advancement. The other side of this is that demotion and downfall also extends to the whole group. The subordinates that Director Kim Chae-kyu had nurtured during long years of activity in the military and in the Army Security Command went along with him to the KCIA, and Kim's excessive confidence that he had a firm circle of first-rate, loyal soldiers was linked with his idea of shooting the president and seizing power.

The treatment of Director Kim Chae-kyu since the incident--changing from simple removal from the directorship, to arrest, and to referral to court martial--have shown a glimpse of the anguish of the leaders of the military. In other words, those leaders were forced to turn away from the tight relationship which had existed previously and perform major surgery to remove a part of the military.

As mentioned previously, Minister No Chae-hyon, JCS Chairman Kim Chong-hwan, Chief of Staff Chong and Director Kim share senior - junior relationships that go back to the military academy.

The talented people in the military and from the military who will be moving up hereafter are Deputy Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyo and Deputy Commander of the U.S. - Korea Joint Command Yu Pyong-hyon, (both of the KMT Seventh Class), and Army Deputy Chief of Staff Yi Hui-song who became acting KCIA Director and reorganized the KCIA immediately after the incident, Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defense Yi Pom-chun, and Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defense Yu Hak-song (all of the Eighth Class).

Of note in the new First Class (Eleventh Class) is Commander Chon Tu-hwan, Chief of the Joint Investigation Headquarters of the Martial Law Command. Commander Chon gained distinction in that class. President Pak had his eye

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on him, and made him chief of the Security Command as a major general. This was an unusual choice in that the post had perviously been held by lieutenant generals. Director Kim Chae-kyu was the superior who had created the Security Command, but in the report of the facts of the crime, Commander Chon reflected the will of the mainstream of the military by maintaining strict neutrality. He determined that Director Kim's crime was 'the result of a personal grievance,' and drew a sharp line between Director Kim and the military, even though Kim was a military elder. Compared with the first ten classes of the military academy--the older generation--whose desire for political power was strong, the Eleventh and subsequent classes have many members with experience in U.S. schools, who have been indoctrinated with a perfect West Point style of training, and have been raised as a generation which understands the administrative methods of civilian control. They are now lieutenant colonels, colonels and Major Generals, and the differences of approach to national political and defense matters between them and the close associates of the politicians and the president, the people who transferred to the president's private organs like the KCIA, are growing more prominent each year.

Another inescapable phenomenon is the fact that there had begun to be a solid core of officers who turned a critical eye on the matter of President Pak having surrounded himself with people of military origin who caught his fancy.

Within the same military there was a substantial change in the quality of the personnel, with the dividing line coming two or three years after the Korean War. Thus, in the last 10 years there have come to be many officers who if anything, tend to share, the same new national and political awareness with the rapidly rising technocrats, government officials returned from the U.S., journalists and scholars.

Moreover, a gap has arisen between them and those like President Pak who have backgrounds in the old Japanese army, to the extent that military experts in Seoul have commented that 'the distinction is so great one would not think they were from the same country.'

It is this new generation of military men that was able to act coolly and take a defense posture that was perfect from the perspective of national security, even in the face of a shock like the assassination of the head of state. Therefore, even if one of the influential persons mentioned in rumors does advance, on the basis of direct national elections and democratic procedures in the National Assembly, there is no question but that he would be strongly influenced by the views of the military.

There is also the factor, however, that one cannot say a person with military background or a strong voice in the military will automatically receive the support of the military. Anticommunism is common to both the ruling and the opposition parties of South Korea. And all classes of the people agree on government premised on a close military relationship with the U.S. Opposition to the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea can also be called a national consensus. In the 1971 presidential election only a million votes separated former presidential candidate Kim Tae-chung from President Pak; it was

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literally personal combat between the two, and it is safe to say that in this direct national election many military personnel cast their votes for Kim Tae-chung.

Waves of Democratization and Change

Acting President Ch'oe Kyu-ha is strongly expected to have only an interim government. The following administration will depend largely on whether there is orderly implementation of such things as enactment of the constitution, normalization of the National Assembly and the holding of fair elections. It is certain that non-military politicians will surface sooner or later--such figures as Kim Yong-sam, President the New Democratic Party, an opposition party constituting an anti-Pak force, former President Yi Ch'ol-sung of that party who has taken a middle course, and Kim Tae-chung who still maintains considerable influence. The old guard who are aiming for a 'Pak-less Pak system' naturally support those with military backgrounds like Kim Chong-p'il, Chong Il-kwon and Yi Hu-rak, and other elders of the ruling party. These are all personalities who demonstrated strength (or shrewdness in some cases) under the Pak regime, and while each of them has his own strengths and weaknesses, they are all at the minimum distance from the next government in terms of popular recognition. Almost no one thinks that military leaders who are not well known to the people would be able in the next while to lead the political world in South Korea, even though they had real influence within the military. It is quite conceivable, on the other hand, that the military, as a collective pressure group, will give its support to the completely civilian Acting President Ch'oe Kyu-ha because of his popular recognition and because he presents little risk.

So far there have been no indications that the military would reject a purely civilian--de-Pakified--government as long as it involves no radical change in the realm of national security.

It is safe to say that over 18 years President Pak succeeded in the 'political emascualtion' of the military, and the side effect of a relative drop in the status of the military cannot be ignored either. At one time the military was the major source of the talent the nation needed, but as the various segments of the society matured, that role of the military gradually came to an end. To the extent that South Korea had to become a modern nation in the areas of diplomacy, economics and domestic politics, control came to be no longer exerted by the military alone. If the scholarly world, the press and labor bring forth multifaceted talent as democratization progresses, the strength of the military can be expected to grow that much weaker. Under the Pak regime the policy of priority to national security and the policy of domestic control functioned as two sides of the same coin, and for that reason the power of the military was maintained in an artificially strengthened form. Because of this, there is a growing feeling that unless the political situation is disrupted to the point of endangering national security, the military will not again leap into the scene as it was 18 years ago.

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It is certain that a transition has been made from an era in which loyalty to President Pak and loyalty to the nation were regarded as the same thing to an era of military men who keep the two strictly divided.

On 16 October President Pak declared martial law in Pusan and garrison law in Masan, using the military to suppress the populace. This was a matter of making wide use of the military as a whole, though it had previously concentrated on 'defense against communism.' Faced with the repressive policy of President Pak, who would not recoil from firing at the people, the military was on the brink of losing the confidence the people had placed in it. Ultimately there was the unexpected resolution in which the KCIA director 'acted alone,' but it is certain that a great sense of uneasiness had arisen at levels below the strictly hard-line President Pak and top military leaders. There are many who point out that there was the danger of eruption of a 'clash' far more dramatic than Pak's shooting. By placing the military in a painful position, President Pak was on the verge of losing the loyalty of the military. One example of this is that on 18 October there were repeated demonstrations made up of students, workers and townsmen in the Pusan area despite martial law, and these could not be put down by military threats in the form of bayonets and tanks. No recourse remained but the exercise of force in the form of rifle fire; troops were sent to restore order and the stage was set for the military to receive a shock. Although he was himself of military background, President Pak had become unable to understand the qualitative changes and generational differences within the military, and under the pressure of time, the 'abandonment of the president' by the military came closer to realization.

The moves of the South Korean military reported in THE NEW YORK TIMES of 2 November show one aspect of the constitution of the military hereafter. It was reported that on 29 and 30 October, two days after Pak's shooting, the generals leading the military quickly held a secret meeting in the Defense Ministry and decided informally to do away with the Yusin Constitution which had been the legal basis for the Pak dictatorship. All were agreed that the constitution could no longer continue after President Pak's death. It is noteworthy that they made this decision before the government ministers.

According to the paper, more than 50 military leaders attended that meeting. Defense Security Command Chief Chon Tu-hwan and other young officers who were deeply loyal to President Pak opposed the hasty abandonment of the constitution, and the date for its abandonment was not decided. There was the view among the military, according to that newspaper, that the status of the government should be frozen for three months. This was probably because the sudden 'loss' of such a strong leader as President Pak was expected to cause such political instability and agitation among the people that national security could be endangered, but judging from the situation one month after that time, there is little indication of the military strengthening its political interference with democratization by such means as blocking repeal of the constitution. Rather, the backbone of the military--the young officers--have been approving the successes of the Pak regime but without concealing

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their opposition to the influential persons and military elders who improperly strengthened their political influence and bolstered the dictatorship.

Because of this, those who feel the military will continue to have great influence in the political situation of South Korea consider it impossible to satisfy the people of that country short of the emergence of new politicians. There are other observers who take the following view: the military, the majority of which belongs to the new generation, and the people are unlikely to support leaders who assisted in the repressive policies of the Park regime or who gained their positions, even temporarily, as pawns of that regime; in such a situation the political consciousness of the people will make a complete turnaround in a short period by means of repeal of the Yushin Constitution and lifting of Presidential Emergency Order No. 9. These observers have begun to see the immense wave of reform that would eventually engulf the military itself.

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N. KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS

KIDNAPPING INCIDENT OF LEBANESE WOMEN BY NORTH KOREANS REPORTED

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Feb 80 pp 146-149

[Article by Commentator Kwi Mun-pom: "Senseless Kidnapping and Brainwashing by North Korea; Plot To Train Foreigners as Spies Exposed by Escape of Five Lebanese Women"]

[Text] The Lebanese newspapers L'ORIENT-LE JOUR (French) of 30 October and the IKE (English) of 30 October reported that, of five Lebanese women transported to North Korea, two have escaped and three still remain there. Also, according to the "Tong-il Ilbo," the Christian religious program in Lebanon, "Voice of Hope," is reported to have broadcast on 17 November that four Lebanese university students, including one female, were spirited away to North Korea and were forced to undergo training in espionage.

Additionally, the SEGYE ILBO of 2 December carried a report by its special correspondent in Seoul regarding efforts by North Korea to transport Lebanese women to North Korea for training in espionage against the United States and South Korea. All of the foregoing reports only give brief sketches of the affair because of limited space. It is therefore difficult to obtain an overall picture of the details, and some observers seem to doubt whether North Korea would actually go to such an extreme.

Origin of Incident and Turn of Events in North Korea

Lebanon is situated at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea between Israel and Syria. It extends to the north and south with the Damascus region in the mid-section. The incident began with its capital city, Beirut, as the center stage. Early in July 1978, two Asians appeared at the YMCA secretarial school in Beirut. They were introduced by a local figure named Shayuki Ajami [phonetic] as Akito Tanaka--an official of Japan's Hitachi, Ltd--and an employee named Kaneyama. They said Hitachi was interested in hiring a large number of secretaries knowledgeable in local affairs and they asked for cooperation in rounding up candidates. The conditions were that the candidates must be 1) physically attractive; 2) fluent in both Arabic and French; 3) unmarried; and 4) they would be given a starting salary of 1,300 dollars; and 5) they must go to Japan for language study and professional training, with travel,

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food and lodging costs to be paid entirely by the company. The five candidates who applied were Samia Kabbara, Naima Kassir, Siham Shraidhi, Haif Skaff and one unnamed person.

The five candidates, accompanied by Shayuki Ajami and guided by Kaneyama, departed from Beirut in August and arrived in Pyongyang via Athens, Belgrade, Moscow and Irkutsk (Soviet military base). At Pyongyang airport, they did not exit from the regular passenger gate, but were led by a man named Kim Won-hyon through a special gate, put on a car and taken to a Western-style, three-storied building. They were later to learn that this was their living quarters and training center. Kaneyama collected their passports and disappeared. Meanwhile, their escort, Shayuki Ajami, returned to Beirut after a stay of 4 days.

Kim Won-hyon, who had brought them to the center from the airport, explained that they must receive preliminary training before going to Japan. At the beginning (about 2 months), they were only shown movies of North Korea and the Soviet Union two or three times a week. These movies always included, in addition to documentaries on development in North Korea and the USSR, lessons on espionage activities.

By the time the five felt more or less settled, ideological training began on the philosophies of Kim Il-song. It was not something accepted by the five women, but the lectures were forced on them unilaterally. The brainwashing included, in addition to such topics as "Anti-Americanism and the South Korean People's Struggle for Liberation," the "Chuche" philosophy (of Kim Il-song). Also, in addition to academic studies, they were trained in sharpshooting, use of explosives, karate, self-defense, lock-breaking, survival during illegal activities and other terrorist training.

However, the five women had not agreed on such activities and frequently argued with Kim Won-hyon during the lectures, demanding that they be returned home. Meanwhile, in April 1979, Shayuki Ajami reappeared and took Samia and Naima to Belgrade, capital of Yugoslavia. The purpose was to compel them to telephone their families in Lebanon, informing them that "they were well and had obtained jobs in Japan." The two considered escape at this point, but were unable to do so under the strict surveillance of the North Korean agents. They realized the North Koreans were determined to train them as spies and ceased to protest that "they be sent to Japan as soon as possible" or to "be returned to Lebanon." They decided to submit ostensibly to the North Korean demands. In order to find an opportunity for escape, they decided to be on good terms with the North Koreans.

On 8 August 1979, the opportunity came. The North Koreans provided the two women with passports under the aliases Yi Ok-yo and Chon Myong-hui, and permitted them to travel to Belgrade and stay at the Metro Hotel in order to again telephone their families regarding their safety.

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The North Korean cadre (mentioned later) was caught completely off guard and allowed the two to visit a beauty salon in the hotel. Immediately on exiting from the hotel, the two took a taxi and sought asylum at the local Kuwaiti Embassy, where they revealed everything and requested assistance. The Kuwaiti Embassy officials escorted them to the Lebanese Embassy and asked for their protection. The two had succeeded in their escape plan. And on 13 August they were provided with special passports requested by the Lebanese Embassy in Yugoslavia from the Home Ministry Public Safety Agency and they returned home via Paris.

When the incident thus became known to the Lebanese Government, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry submitted a formal inquiry to the North Korean Government and launched an investigation concerning the five North Korean operatives who had spirited the five women out of Lebanon. As a result, it became clear that Shayuki Ajami was "chairman of the Lebanon branch of the Kim Il-song philosophy committee"; that Akito Tanaka was a figure who had entered Lebanon temporarily from North Korea to give operational instructions; and that Kaneyama was actually Na Chun-ui, deputy delegate of the North Korean trade delegation in Lebanon.

Foreign Minister Butrus of Lebanon summoned the North Korean trade representative in Lebanon and demanded an explanation concerning the transport and detention of the Lebanese women in North Korea. He also demanded an immediate report on the whereabouts of the three other women still in North Korea. This resulted in reports published in various local newspapers on 30 October. Subsequently, as the result of strong demands by the Lebanese side, North Korea reluctantly permitted the remaining three women to return home safely on 16 November. The incident thus appeared to be settled, but it was only the incident concerning the Lebanese women which was settled.

Samia and Naima, who had previously escaped, reported that there were other young men and women from Lebanon, the Mideast, Europe and other countries throughout the world, including South Korean citizens, who were involved. Also, Haifa Skaff, who returned later, stated that five French women and others from the Netherlands and West Germany were being trained.

Life in North Korea

The locale where the five Lebanese women lived and received training is said to be a village of some 500 households about 40 kilometers from Pyongyang (direction not clarified). The five women were placed in a splendid three-storied, Western-style building where the food was said to be Western-style and of high quality. Not only this building, but also all the other educational buildings in the village were called "reception centers." Military personnel were placed as sentries at the entrances and soldiers made inspection rounds periodically. Therefore, the building was completely isolated from the other "reception centers" in the village and the women could not exchange a word with the other trainees they met outside during drills.

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At the reception center where the five women lived, there was an "omni" who served and cleaned for them while managing and guarding them. There was also a cook (also called an "omni"). These persons reportedly arrived at work at 6 in the morning and returned at 11 at night to a small house directly in front of the reception center. Additionally, there was a male instructor who lectured on the "Chuche" philosophy and taught them Arabic. His name was Kim Won-hyon. There was also another male who was called a "cadre," who observed the progress of instruction and gave orders to the instructor. He gave an examination once a month, checked the results and offered encouragement (the same cadre who was in Beirut).

The Lebanese women received a monthly stipend of 200 won (about 50,000 Japanese yen) and were permitted to purchase daily commodities and confectioneries at an exclusive store. Sometimes they bought gifts for the "omnis" and instructors. The living standard of the cadres appeared to be quite good, but the instructors and "omnis" did not have enough to eat, so the five women reportedly shared their food with them.

The building had a lecture room (there were 2 days of instruction a week) and a television viewing room (called a theater) on the first floor. The second floor had a dining room, kitchen and rooms for the "omnis." The third floor had bedrooms for the five Lebanese women and a lecture room.

What was unbearable was that, at the beginning, as soon as the meal was over the five women felt faint and their pulse beats dropped perceptibly-- a condition which continued for some time. It seems certain that, in order to weaken their will to protest, some kind of drug was being inserted into their food. Furthermore, there was one unforgiveable occasion when Samia fell while taking a bath and broke a tooth. Although the broken tooth caused bleeding, nothing was done for her for 2 weeks. After her condition worsened considerably, an operation was finally performed without any anesthesia. The explanation given was that, because Samia was destined to become a spy (she had feigned compliance), she had to be trained in endurance, so that she could absolutely refuse to reveal any secrets in case she was caught by American or South Korean investigators.

Denial of Human Rights and Self Righteousness of North Korea

The fraudulent and deceitful makeup of North Korea became worse and its self righteousness grew to the point where it was no longer satisfied with transporting South Korean residents of Japan to Pyongyang for training as spies. It also deceived and shanghaied young people throughout the world in an attempt to groom them as espionage agents. If the two Lebanese women had not succeeded in escaping, they would have continued to be "educated" in North Korea until they had really become brainwashed. Among the numerous young people in the "reception centers," anyone who was determined to avoid being brainwashed might have disappeared into oblivion and become untraceable. Such disregard of human rights, self righteousness and barbarity on the part of North Korea will probably increase as long as Kim Il-song remains in power.

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What would result if these young people undergoing brainwashing were to really be sent out as spies? There would probably be cases where diplomats and overseas representatives of commercial firms of free nations might fall prey and commit traitorous acts to protect their individual safety. Also, it cannot be absolutely certain that diplomats and representatives of commercial firms from South Korea stationed overseas would not disappear suddenly and announce several days later that they had "sought refuge in Pyongyang." There is the example of the South Korean artist and his family residing in Paris, who were kidnapped to North Korea via Yugoslavia.

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